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ABSTRACT: This paper is focused on the abstractist theory of fictional discourse, namely, the semantic theory according 
to which fictional names refer to abstract entities. Two semantic problems that arise in relation to that position 
are analysed: the first is the problem of accounting for the intuitive truth of typically fictive uses of statements 
containing fictional names; the second is the one of explaining some problematic metafictive uses, in particular, 
the use of intuitively true negative existentials.
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RESUMEN: Este artículo se ocupa de la teoría abstracta del discurso de ficción, a saber, la teoría semántica según la cual 
los nombres de ficción refieren a entidades abstractas. Se analizan dos problemas semánticos que surgen en rela-
ción con esta posición: el primero es el problema de dar cuenta de la verdad intuitiva de usos típicamente ficti-
vos de enunciados que contienen nombres de ficción; el segundo es el de explicar algunos usos metafictivos pro-
blemáticos, en particular el uso de existenciales negativos intuitivamente verdaderos.
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In this paper I am concerned with the abstractist theory of fictional discourse, namely, the 
semantic theory according to which fictional names refer to abstract entities (Kripke 2011 
and 2013, van Inwagen 1977, Salmon 1998, Thomasson 1999, Predelli 2002, among oth-
ers). As emphasised by Kripke, those entities are not to be conceived of either in terms 
of nonexistent ones, along the lines of neo-Meinongians (Parsons 1980 and 1982), or as 
merely possible ones, following Lewis’ suggestions (1978): they are rather fictional char-
acters, a sui generis kind of abstract entities, namely, ones that originated in acts of artistic 
creation, such as literary writing and storytelling. My purpose is to focus on two semantic 
problems that arise in relation to that position: the first one is accounting for the truth of 
some typically fictive uses, such as the tokening of
(1) Ulysses is sleeping on the beach of Ithaca
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as it occurs in the Odyssey, given that, as will be clear below, a literary character like Ulysses 
cannot literally and strictly have the property of being asleep. The second one is accounting 
for some problematic metafictive uses, in particular, the use of intuitively true negative ex-
istentials, such as
(2) Ulysses does not exist,
which on this account come out false, since ‘Ulysses’ is taken to refer to an existent literary 
character.
1. The abstractist framework: some background assumptions
What is an abstract entity? Traditionally, it is an entity that is not concrete, namely, that 
does not have a spatiotemporal location. The most common kind of abstract entities that 
have been posited to exist are properties, sets, classes and numbers, which have not been 
created by anybody and will exist forever. On most conceptions, abstract properties have 
been thought to be universal entities.1 Abstractists about fictional discourse think that 
those are not the only kind of abstract entities that can be posited, though: there are also 
some abstract entities, namely, fictional characters, which are created when some artworks, 
prominently literary ones, are and disappear together with them. They are thought to be a 
kind of artefact, namely, something that is not natural.2
So, the introduction of this new kind of abstract entities involves a change in the 
traditional conception, since fictional characters do have a temporal location, even if, of 
course, it is a non-standard one: they exist whenever the corresponding artworks might be 
considered to exist, and they are particulars, not universals. More specifically, literary char-
acters are thought to depend on the existence of literary narratives, which are in turn gen-
erally conceived of as depending for their existence on some physical realisation —a writ-
ten copy, a living memory, etc.— of an abstract structure.3 Moreover, literary characters 
are conceived of as the theoretical objects of literary theory and cultural studies, as much 
as The French Revolution, for instance, can be regarded as a theoretical object of his-
tory. In this sense, they are the referents of some theoretical terms, in particular, names, of 
those disciplines, as much as species have been thought to be the referents of the theoreti-
1 An exception is the conception of properties in terms of tropes, which are thought to be abstract partic-
ulars (Campbell 1990).
2 An exception to this line originated in Kripke’s 1973 manuscript is Zalta (1983), who claims that fic-
tional characters are akin to Platonic entities, namely, they are not created (which strikes me as a very 
counterintuitive claim).
3 See Thomasson (1999) for a typical account of abstract characters as dependent on abstract artworks. 
In contrast, there are authors who reject the claim that literary (or musical) artworks can be conceived 
of in terms of abstract entities. García Ramírez and Mayerhofer (2015) object that no abstract entity 
can be created, since abstract entities exist outside time, which amounts to an altogether rejection of 
the possibility of the existence of any sui generis kind of abstract entities. Although it is a complicated 
issue, I suspect some types can be created: one can create a bus line, which cannot be identified with 
any concrete bus following a certain route; words and, in general, languages seem to provide us with 
another example of created abstract entities.
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cal terms of biology –after all, from some perspectives (Ghiselin 1974, Hull 1976, 1978), 
species, though non-abstract, have also been conceived of as peculiar particulars.
Setting aside the metaphysical details concerning the nature of literary characters, 
which I do not intend to go deep into, the semantic point is that they are taken to be the 
referents of the proper names appearing in literary narratives (and the discourse about 
them), hence being rigidly designated by them. Back to our initial example, ‘Ulysses’ des-
ignates Ulysses, a literary character, in all the possible worlds in which it exists. Two claims 
are hereby involved: (i) given that in all the worlds Ulysses is an abstract entity, there is no 
possible world in which Ulysses is a war hero, and in general no possible world in which 
it exists as a real person; (ii) the worlds in which Ulysses gets killed in the war of Troy or 
drowns in the middle of the ocean are not real possibilities either. I will explain both claims 
below.
To begin with the first claim, if ‘Ulysses’ designates a literary character, namely, an ab-
stract entity, in all possible worlds, there will be no possible world in which Ulysses is a real 
person: what might have existed is a world in which there is a real person with all the prop-
erties attributed to Ulysses in the Odyssey but that person would not be identical to Ulysses 
since he would not be a literary character created in Ancient Greece but would have had a 
different origin.4 A real possibility is, for instance, a world in which Ulysses is not the well-
known character that he is, since all traces of Greek civilisation have disappeared from it. 
In general, real possibilities are the worlds in which Ulysses is a character that lacks some of 
the properties he has in the real world, such as the property of being a well-known charac-
ter, or has properties that are different from the ones he actually has, such as the property 
of being ignored by most literary critics.
The second claim states that the worlds in which Ulysses gets killed in the war of Troy 
or drowns in the middle of the ocean are not real possibilities either. It also follows from 
the thesis that ‘Ulysses’ rigidly designates a literary character, namely, an abstract entity: 
if Ulysses is an abstract entity in all the worlds in which it exists, there will be no possible 
world in which it has properties such as getting killed in the war of Troy or drowning in 
the ocean, namely, properties that can only be possessed by concrete (and living) entities. 
Notice that this does not imply that all the properties that are ascribed to a character in a 
fictional narrative are constitutive of that character: the character might have had in the 
fiction properties that are not the ones it has in it. In terms of the previous example, the 
Odyssey might have been such that Ulysses died in the war of Troy, namely, Ulysses might 
have fictionally died in Troy.5 But, in as far as those are possibilities in the fictional story 
or, to put it in different terms, internal to a fictional narrative, I take them to be purely fic-
tional, though not real, possibilities. It looks then as if a fictional narrative serves to intro-
4 What about those characters like the Napoleon of War and Peace, which, in contrast with Ulysses, 
may be considered to be also real entities? I do not want to take a side on this controversial issue. If 
such characters were imported from the real world, my claim should be restricted to (what may then 
be regarded as) the strictly fictional characters; otherwise, it could be taken to cover all the characters 
belonging in a fictional narrative. I owe this important clarification to a comment made by an anony-
mous referee. 
5 This clarification has been introduced in reply to an important comment made by an anonymous ref-
eree. 
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duce a fictional context, with its set of alternative worlds –which may be conceivable or im-
aginable but not metaphysically possible ones. Counterfactuals, like
(3)  If Ulysses had been enchanted by the songs of the mermaids, he would never have 
made his way back to Ithaca
are made true by some of those purely fictional possible worlds.
2. How can a literary character be sleeping on a beach?
Some people find it intuitive that there is a reading that makes (1) true, as opposed to
(4) Ulysses is sleeping on a Caribbean beach,
which does not have such a reading. As is known, Kripke (1973) has originally distin-
guished between two possible readings of statements containing fictional names: whereas 
external or factual uses (“out and out”) are uses made to describe the real world, internal or 
fictional uses (“according to the story”) are those made to describe what happens in a fic-
tional story. More specifically, among these, which will be jointly referred to as ‘fictional’, 
it is possible to distinguish fictive uses, made within the framework of a fictional narrative, 
from parafictive ones, made from outside the corresponding fictional framework, such as 
a tokening of (1) in a literature class.6 Accordingly, it can be claimed that factually inter-
preted (1) is intuitively false, but if interpreted fictionally it comes out intuitively true. As 
is also known, though, some philosophers, along Frege’s lines, think that no fictional use 
of (1) can be either true or false, since there is no place for genuine truth-values within the 
realm of fiction -at most, one might say that utterances are loyal (or disloyal) to a narrative 
or true (or false) relative to a narrative.7 Be that as it may, an explanation of the notion of 
truth in a fictional story or relative to a fictional narrative seems to be required in relation to 
our typical fictional uses.
Now, prima facie the abstractist seems to have a problem in explaining the fictional truth 
of fictional uses: in as far as ‘Ulysses’ refers to an abstract entity, there is no possible reading 
that makes (1) true, since no abstract entity can be sleeping on a beach.8 (Moreover, it seems 
to be not only false but also categorically false, namely, involving a categorial mistake.)
The standard abstractist answer has appealed to the claim that, appearances to the con-
trary notwithstanding, statements like (1) involve an ambiguous predication, since there 
are two senses in which one can ascribe a property to a fictional character: a character can 
be said either to instantiate a property or to encode it (Zalta 1983).9 Therefore, coming 
6 See, for instance, Bonomi (2008).
7 More specifically, this is usually held in relation to fictive uses, whereas parafictive ones are mostly re-
garded as having a truth-value.
8 See, for instance, the following quote from Sainsbury: “No abstract object is a detective, or plays the vi-
olin, or flies, so ordinary sentences from fiction (like ‘Holmes is a detective’, ‘Holmes plays the violin’, 
‘Pegasus flies’) will receive the same truth-value, false, whether on the RWR account or on the account 
in which these uses are awarded robust fictional characters as referents.” (2005, p. 211)
9 See also van Inwagen (2003), who puts the distinction in terms of the contrast between having and 
holding a property.
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back to the example, even if it is false that Ulysses instantiates the property of being asleep, 
it is true that it encodes it, since it is the property that it is thought to have in the story nar-
rated by the Odyssey.10 As pointed out by Crane, the properties that are encoded by char-
acters seem to be representation-dependent ones: “The best way to think of non-existent 
objects as encoding properties is to think of them as being represented as having these prop-
erties” (Crane 2013, p. 70). But this does not seem to help the abstractist solve his problem: 
the fact that an abstract object can be taken to represent (by means of a fictional narrative, 
of course) a concrete one and thus be ascribed properties that are typically ascribed to con-
crete objects is precisely what has to be explained. Therefore, the distincion between hav-
ing properties in itself and having properties by virtue of being a representation of another ob-
ject is as much clarifying as the the distinction between instancing and codifying a property: 
both seem to be an alternative way of pointing out the existence of two possible readings (a 
factual and a fictional one) for the statements at stake.
Another traditional approach has it that on its fictional interpretation (1) is semanti-
cally equivalent to the following statement, containing a fiction operator, usually construed 
in terms of an intensional operator,
(5) According to the Odyssey, Ulysses is sleeping on the beach of Ithaca,
which is literally and strictly true (Lewis 1978). ‘According to the Odyssey’, like any in-
tensional operator, is taken to shift the circumstance of evaluation of the embedded sen-
tence from the actual world to an alternative, merely possible one, namely, the world 
as described in the Odyssey. As explained above, though, the abstractist cannot take the 
world at stake (a world in which Ulysses is a real person that sailed back to Ithaca after 
having fought in Troy) to be a possible world at all: in as far as ‘Ulysses’ is a rigid designa-
tor, the name is supposed to designate the same abstract entity in all the possible worlds 
in which it exists (and nothing otherwise), hence not anyone who can sail, fight or fall 
asleep. So, for an abstractist, there is a tension between, on the one hand, taking fic-
tional names to be rigid designators, and, on the other, being committed to the existence 
of a possible world in which our fictional name ‘Ulysses’ designates something different 
from what it designates in the actual world, namely, a real person who can, among other 
things, fall asleep.11 12
I would then like to explore a different line, the so-called ‘Context-Shift View’ (Predelli 
1997, 2005 and 2008, Recanati 2010). According to it, fictional uses, rather than including 
an implicit intensional operator that shifts the circumstance of evaluation of an allegedly 
embedded sentence, involve a shift of context: whereas factual uses are to be interpreted and 
evaluated in relation to some parametric values determined by the context of utterance, fic-
10 Notice that neo-Meinongians have put forward a parallel distinction between kinds of properties: ac-
cording to them, Ulysses can be truly said to have both the extra-nuclear property of being a liter-
ary character and the nuclear property of being asleep on the beach of Ithaca. See Parsons (1980) and 
Priest (2005). 
11 Notice that this problem does not arise if fictional names are not taken to be rigid designators, as is the 
case with Lewis (1978), who takes them to designate those individuals, however different they hap-
pened to be among themselves, satisfying the corresponding description in each possible world; from 
an ontological point of view, they are considered to be counterparts of one another.
12 For other criticisms made to this approach, see, for instance, Predelli (2005, p. 69).
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tional ones must be interpreted and evaluated in relation to values set by a different con-
text. Such context provides us with what might be called ‘the point of view of the fictional 
narrative’, as opposed to the point of view of reality. In Predelli’s own terms:
Suppose that we are discussing Milos Forman’s film Amadeus, and that I say
(6) Salieri commissioned the Requiem.
My utterance is apparently true: in the film, the composer Antonio Salieri is the mysterious 
figure who anonymously commissions the Mass for the Dead. […] (2005, p. 66)
In this case, the parameter which differentiates the appropriate index from the simple-
minded index is the possible world co-ordinate: the index with respect to which my utterance is 
evaluated does not contain the world in which it took place, i.e., the actual world, but ‘the world’ 
of the story. (2005, p. 70)13
According to my interpretation of this proposal, accounting for the intuition that any fic-
tional use of (1) is true requires shifting the context, which implies that the statement gets 
evaluated with respect to a world that is neither the actual world in which the utterance 
takes place nor any alternative metaphysically possible world but the world of the story, a 
purely fictional world -in the above explained sense in which some possibilities are not real 
but purely fictional ones.14 Now, although I strongly agree with this view, there are certain 
aspects I would like to elaborate in a different way.
Predelli thinks that the indexicals occurring in a certain fictional statement get their 
corresponding referents in relation to (not the real context of utterance but) what may be 
called ‘the fictional context’. The following quotation, though a bit long, is clear on this 
point:
Suppose that, while talking about the film [Amadeus], I say:
(8) Although Mozart thought that the mysterious figure was his father’s ghost, the actual 
commissioner of the Requiem was Salieri.
Given how things are described in the film, this utterance is intuitively true. But in order to 
obtain the correct interpretation for ‘the actual commissioner’, (8) must be evaluated with re-
spect to an index containing the fictional world of Amadeus as its world parameter. With respect 
to such an index, ‘the actual commissioner of the Requiem’ denotes Salieri, and the sentence ‘The 
actual commissioner of the Requiem was Salieri’ comes out true. But with respect to the world in 
which my utterance takes place [...] ‘the actual commissioner of the Requiem’ denotes Count Walsegg, 
and ‘The actual commissioner of the Requiem was Salieri’ is, wrongly, evaluated as false. (Predelli 
2005, p. 70, my emphasis)
Likewise, he seems to think that fictional definite descriptions and names are to be inter-
preted in relation to the fictional context, which is the only context in play in interpreting 
fictional statements.
Following Walton (1990), I think that fictional uses are to be mainly interpreted as in-
volving an indication or a prescription of what we are supposed to imagine to exist while be-
13 ‘Index’ is Predelli’s word for what is usually called ‘context’.
14 For the sake of simplicity, I would assume that circumstances of evaluation are constituted only by pos-
sible worlds, though other parameters, such as times, are commonly included as well.
Theoria 31(2).indd   148 12/5/16   10:32:40
Theoria 31/2 (2016): 143-158
 Fictional Names and Literary Characters: A Defence of Abstractism 149
ing aware that it does not.15 Making and understanding them involve engaging oneself in an 
interpretative process that in turn involves a use of the imagination that is characteriscally 
disentangled from our perception of the external world and our action in it. Now, I think 
that the interpretative process at stake has as its point of departure our interaction with the 
literary artwork: more specifically, at a first stage, we interpret the literary narrative as such 
(as opposed to a journalistic chronicle, for instance), which means that we take the fictional 
names in it to refer to literary characters (as opposed to real people). This is the ground in 
which our imaginative powers anchor: then, at a second stage, we imagine those literary 
characters to be real people who lead their own real lives. (This can be taken to replicate, in 
the sphere of semantic competence, Walton’s metaphysical conception of games of make-
believe as involving a prop as the basis of the imaginative process.)
So, differently from Predelli, I think that the indexicals, definite descriptions and names 
occurring in a fictional narrative get their referents in relation to the real context of utterance, 
which is subsequently imagined to be totally different from the way it is like as a matter of fact. 
It is precisely the work of our imagination on the objects provided by the real context of ut-
terance that determines the context shift. In other words, we shift from one context to the 
other because we are able to transform, imaginatively, what is originally given to us, by virtue 
of our interpretative interaction with the literary narrative. This one plays the role of a man-
ual: if it were not for the descriptions of the characters, places and times that it contains, we 
would not be able to imagine anything at all in the face of the fictional use of names and in-
dexicals. In terms of the previous example, the fictional interpretation of ‘Ulysses’ involves 
referring to a literary character that is imagined to be a real person, on the grounds of the 
profile provided by the Odyssey. Likewise, the fictional intepretation of ‘actual’ involves 
referring to the real world that is imagined to be a fictional one, different from what the 
world is like as a matter of fact; and so on with the rest of the indexicals.16 As for Predel-
li’s example, I would say that ‘the actual commissioner of the Requiem’ in sentence (8) in-
cluded in the above quotation denotes a fictional character, who is imagined to be Salieri, a 
real person, on the grounds of the main personality traits carefully provided by Amadeus.
Now, once the context has been shifted by the work of our imagination, the corre-
sponding use will be evaluated as true or false with respect to the world of the new con-
15 The italicised part of the sentence has a significant import because it points out the difference be-
tween our use of imagination regarding fictional narratives and our use of it regarding factual ones. See 
M atravers (2014) for the claim that imagination is not only put to work in our engagement with fic-
tion.
16 On this point, Recanati seems to think something similar: “The objective features of the context of ut-
terance are indeed ‘given’ and, to that extent, they cannot be shifted. But what the speaker can do is 
pretend that the context is different from what it is. If the pretence is mutually manifest, it will be part 
of what the speaker means that the sentence is uttered in a context different from the actual context 
c. In such a situation a context shift does occur: there are two contexts, the actual context c in which 
the sentence is produced, and the pretend context c’ in which the utterance presents itself as being 
produced.” (2010, p. 193) However, there are two main aspects on which I disagree with him. First, I 
think that the features of the context of utterance are generally ‘not given’: far from that, they require a 
process of interpretation on the interpreter’s part, who puts his/her pragmatic knowledge at work. Sec-
ondly, I do not not think it is necessary to imagine that the sentence is uttered in a different context: 
as pointed out in the text, most of the times, it is enough to imagine that the character is a real person, 
the real world, a fictional one, etc.
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text (namely, the new home-circumstance). In terms of the previous example, once we get 
to imaginatively build up a person from our understanding of Ulysses’ personality traits 
and deeds, any fictional use of (1) will come out true with respect to his fictional world, 
the world of the Odyssey. Likewise, once we get to imaginatively build up a person from 
our understanding of Salieri’s personality traits and deeds, any fictional use of (8) in the 
above quotation from Predelli will come out true with respect to the fictional world of 
A madeus.17
To summarise,
ii(i) indexicals, definite descriptions and names get interpreted in their original con-
text of utterance,
i(ii) the work of our imagination determines what can be characterised as a context 
shift,
(iii) utterances and inscriptions get evaluated as true or false with respect to the world 
of the new context.
There are some aspects of this view that I would like to clarify.
First of all, the fictional world of the Odyssey, though relevant to evaluate any fictional 
use of (1), does not have any role to play in fixing the referent of ‘Ulysses’, constituted by the 
literary character on which it was originally grounded by the author of the Odyssey in the 
actual world. Like any other name, fictional or otherwise, ‘Ulysses’ is a rigid designator: it 
designates that very literary character in all the worlds in which it exists. What determines 
the identity of a character across worlds is similar to what determines the identity of a real 
person: in both cases, it seems to be a historical trait, but whereas in the case of people that 
trait is constituted by a genetic code, in the case of characters it is constituted by the crea-
tion of the corresponding literary narrative.
Secondly, as we haven seen, imagination determines a context shift, according to which 
the world relevant to the evaluation of a fictional use turns out to be a purely fictional one. 
Notice that, as mentioned before, such a world is not a metaphysically possible one: it is 
the world as described in a literary narrative, the product of an author’s imagination. It is 
a conceivable world, an epistemically possible one, namely, a way we might have come to 
know the world to be had it been as imagined by a certain author or storyteller. Epistemic 
possibilities include worlds that are compatible with what can be known a priori, namely, 
before developing an empirical research –for all we know a priori, water might be XYZ and 
Hesperus might be different from Phosphorus. Likewise, for all we know a priori, Ulysses 
might be a real person rather than being a literary character.18
Finally, I would like to address the following worry: is it not implausible and even ab-
surd to think that readers of fiction are asked to imagine that abstract entities are either 
17 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the present proposal is akin to Salmon’s 1998 abstractist the-
ory. My contribution is centered on offering a specific explanation of how fictional uses can be taken 
to be true in a fictional or relative to a fictional narrative, within that kind of framework.
18 I am setting aside the fact that some fictional narratives seem to involve logically impossible worlds, 
namely, worlds that are neither metaphysically nor conceivable or epistemically possible, as pointed 
out by Lewis (1978). Anyway, the minimal point that the relevant world of evaluation is not a meta-
physically possible one still holds.
Theoria 31(2).indd   150 27/4/16   17:55:56
Theoria 31/2 (2016): 143-158
 Fictional Names and Literary Characters: A Defence of Abstractism 151
concrete things or human beings populating fictional worlds?19 I think this objection mixes 
up characters with their metaphysical descriptions: in interacting with literary narratives, 
and, more particularly, in understanding fictional names, readers grasp literary characters, 
which, from the abstractist’s perspective, are to be construed in terms of abstract entities. 
Likewise, in understanding a mathematical text, one grasps numbers, which may be meta-
physically construed in different ways (in terms of psychological capacities, abstract ob-
jects, etc.). As readers, we are not conscious of the metaphysical status of the referents of the 
terms we deal with. In as far as I know, something similar could be said about our interac-
tion with people: we generally do not know what kind of entities we are thought to be from 
a metaphysical point of view.20
3. On true negative existentials
3.1. Why are true negative existentials a problem?
As stated above, some statements containing fictional terms, paradigmatically exemplified 
by (1), require a fictional interpretation to come out true. In contrast, some others, exem-
plified by (8),
(8) Ulysses is the main character of the Odyssey
usually give rise to factual or metafictive uses, namely, uses of statements containing fic-
tional names, made to describe the real world -in the most typical ones, they serve to ascribe 
literary characters features that are not ascribed to them in the corresponding fictional nar-
ratives.21 Accordingly, they must be interpreted in relation to the parametric values deter-
mined by the real context of utterance and evaluated, like most statements, with respect to 
the home circumstance, that is, a pair constituted by the actual world and the time of utter-
ance. This allows for an intuitively correct evaluation of (8), which comes out true, given 
that ‘Ulysses’ refers to Ulysses, a literary character, who, as a matter of fact, stars, among 
other artworks, the Ancient epic poem.
Now, true negative existentials like the previous (2), repeated below,
(2) Ulysses does not exist,
involve a prima facie problem for this proposal. As usual, this statement can be interpreted 
in two different ways: fictionally and factually. The first interpretation amounts to the idea 
19 This worry has been forcefully pressed by an anonymous referee. As he/she points out, it has been put 
forward by Sainsbury (2005) against abstractist theories, in particular, the version proposed by Salmon 
in his 1998’s article.
20 As far as authors of fictional narratives are concerned, from an abstractist point of view, they can also 
be taken to interact with characters, whose metaphysical status as abstract entities may be completely 
ignored by them (and is usually far from their interests).
21 Strictly speaking, in metafictive uses, one intends to assert something about a fictional character, as it 
happens on the typical use of (8), whereas in factual uses, one mistakenly takes the character to be a 
real person and intends to assert something about that alleged person, as would be the case with an ut-
terance of “Penelope waited ten years for Ulysses to come back from Troy”, made under the wrong im-
pression that Penelope and Ulysses were historical figures.
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that Ulysses does not exist in the world of the corresponding fictional story. This is cer-
tainly not what is usually meant in uttering (2), since Ulysses clearly exists in the world 
of the Odyssey. So, what is usually meant must be the factual interpretation, namely, that 
U lysses, the character, does not exist in the real world.22 But, interpreted in this second 
way, the theory makes (2) false, since in the real world Ulysses exists as the literary charac-
ter referred to by ‘Ulysses’.23
Notice that statements of that kind have always been considered to be a bit paradoxi-
cal: in uttering (2) we seem to be first identifying an object, Ulysses, to then say of it that it 
does not exist. An argument along the following lines seems to have paved the way to Mei-
nongian ontology:
ii(i) (2) is meaningful.
i(ii) If (2) is meaningful, it has to be true or false (given bivalence).
(iii) (2) is a subject-predicate sentence.
(iv) A subject-predicate sentence is true if and only if the object referred to by the sub-
ject does have the property expressed by the predicate and is false if and only if the 
object referred to by the subject does not have the property expressed by the pred-
icate.
Then,
i(v) There is an object referred to by the subject of (2).
Neo-Meinongians (Parsons 1980 and 1982, Priest 2005) have followed von Meinong 
(1904) in taking the object in question to be the nonexistent Ulysses. The main reac-
tions are well-known. Russell (1905) has rejected premise (iii): on his view, (2) is not a 
subject-predicate sentence but an existentially quantified one –as such, it does not as-
cribe a property to a particular object but expresses a general proposition, such as “There 
is nobody who survived the war of Troy and came back to Ithaca after a long journey”.24 
Based both on Frege’s thesis that existence is not a first-order predicate and his seman-
tic dualism, Church (1956) has construed (2) as expressing a proposition of the likes of 
“The concept of Ulysses is empty”, namely, as a statement about an individual concept or 
Fregean sense.
As must be clear, those options are not open to the abstractist. On the one hand, as 
emphasised at the beginning, an abstractist is not a neo-Meinongian, so she does not want 
22 According to what is said in the previous footnote, this would be, strictly speaking, a metafictive inter-
pretation, given that one is supposed to intend to say something about not a real person but a character 
(namely, Ulysses).
23 See the following fragment from Kripke’s text: “Why not say that when one says ‘Hamlet does not ex-
ist’ one is speaking of a fictional character? Perhaps many people might think that that is what I want 
to say. But it can’t be right, taken straightforwardly, because one is not saying of a fictional character 
that it doesn’t exist. On the contrary, the fictional character does exist. So the fictional character is not 
something which is being said not to exist. If you say that the fictional character didn’t exist, you would 
be wrongly assimilating this case to the case of Moloch, where one can say truly, as I did before, there 
was no such god as Moloch, that Moloch did no exist. That is in contrast with the case of Hamlet, 
rather than being the same kind of case. If one wishes to talk about the fictional character, one should 
say that it does exist.” (Kripke 2013, pp. 147-148)
24 I use angular brackets to designate propositions.
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to ontologically commit herself to a realm of nonexistent objects -abstract entities exist, as 
much as concrete ones. On the other hand, Russell’s proposal and Church’s construal are 
not viable options for her either, since she wants to stick to the idea that the concept of 
existence is a first-order predicate, namely, it expresses a property of individuals (Kripke 
2013). So, the abstractist has to explain how we can truly say of Ulysses that it does not ex-
ist -given that it is neither a Meinongian nonexistent nor an individual concept.
As is known, Kripke (2013) has suggested a solution crucially appealing to the notion 
of proposition -“There is no true proposition that there are bandersnatches”, “There is no 
such true proposition as that Sherlock Holmes exists –in fact, really no such proposition at 
all as that Sherlock Holmes exists” (pp. 119-20). A problem with this proposal is that, to go 
on with the previous example, the fact that there is no proposition at all as that Ulysses ex-
ists does not seem to help us clarify the fact that Ulysses does not exist (if anything, it will 
be the other around: the fact that Ulysses does not exist explains why there is no proposi-
tion at all as that Ulysses exists). Therefore, it does not address what I take to be a serious 
challenge for abstractist accounts, namely, accounting for the true factual reading of (2). In 
what follows, I am going to pursue a different line.
3.2. A perspectivist proposal
As is known, according to the so-called ‘Non-Indexical Contextualism’, certain kinds of 
statements, in particular, evaluative statements, knowledge ascriptions, epistemic modals 
and future contingents, are true or false with respect to circumstances of evaluation consti-
tuted by a set of parameters that is richer than the usual pair of a possible world and a time 
(MacFarlane 2007a and 2009, Recanati 2007). Non-Indexical Contextualism involves 
thus an extension of Classical intensional semantics so as to include, together with possi-
ble worlds and times, new parameters in the circumstances of evaluation for certain kinds 
of statements, such as a standard of taste relevant to the evaluation of statements of taste 
or, to put another example, an epistemic standard, relevant to the evaluation of knowl-
edge ascriptions. Those statements are thus thought to exhibit a kind of contextual sensi-
tivity that is different from the contextual sensitivity of indexical ones: it is not their con-
tent but their truth-value that is context-sensitive -hence the name given to this approach, 
‘Non-Indexical Contextualism’. Their context-invariable contents are evaluated as true or 
false with respect to circumstances that include a new parameter, usually a kind of standard, 
whose value is inherited from the context of utterance by default. Notice that this position 
only involves a mild or moderate form of relativism, since once the possible world, the time 
and the relevant standard are settled, the corresponding utterance or inscription will get 
definitive and absolute truth-conditions.25 Moreover, it is worth emphasising that the pro-
posal is restricted to some particular kinds of statements (the above-mentioned evaluative 
statements, knowledge ascriptions, epistemic modals and future contingents): it then in-
volves not only a mild or moderate but also a local form of relativism. Now, in what follows 
25 In this regard, Non-Indexical Contextualism can be contrasted with more extreme forms of relativism, 
such as the position defended later on by MacFarlane in several works (2003, 2005, 2007b and 2014), 
called ‘Relativism’, according to which any utterance or inscription of an evaluative judgment/knowl-
edge ascription/epistemic modal/future contingent can be indefinitely re-evaluated as true or false 
from different contexts of assessment.
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I would like to argue that Non-Indexical Contextualism might also be applied to the analy-
sis of that part of our discourse constituted by existential statements. My grounds for this 
claim is that I take those uses to be perspectival, and consequently they must be evaluated as 
true or false with respect to not only a possible world and a time but also a certain perspective. 
Once perspectives are taken on board, it will be possible to explain how an abstractist can 
allow for a reading of (2) that makes it true.
First of all, I will try to clarify in what sense I take the use of existential statements to 
involve a certain perspective. Our common, metaphysically uninformed use of the exist-
ence predicate restricts its application to concrete entities that are present at the time of ut-
terance, since it is common knowledge that a general feature of concrete entities is that they 
endure for a certain period of time.26 Accordingly, we usually hold true statements such as
 (9) Napoleon has ceased to exist
(10) Troy does not exist any longer
(11) The first baby of the twenty-fifth century does not still exist
(12) Unicorns do not exist,
since, standardly, in uttering existential statements we ascribe the property of concrete ex-
istence with respect to a temporal condition (determined by the context of utterance, for 
instance, some time during the twenty-first century), which Napoleon, the city of Troy, 
the first baby of the twenty-fifth century and unicorns certainly lack. But it is clear that 
the predicate can be applied in other ways. For one thing, someone might have reasons for 
applying it to a different kind of entities, depending on her beliefs and commitments. Ac-
cordingly, it is worth noticing that there are existential statements that look more akin to 
eternal sentences, namely, sentences whose truth-values do not vary with respect to a time 
parameter. Statements such as
(13) Numbers exist
(14) Fairness exists
(15) Properties exist, as well as individuals/There are properties, as well as individuals
(16) God exists
seem to behave, for semantic evaluative purposes, like “The Earth turns around the sun” or 
“Grass is green”. Notice, though, that they are not used in everyday-life situations but are 
characteristic of metaphysical debates, among philosophers of mathematics, political phi-
losophers and general metaphysicians, or theological debates among philosophers of re-
ligion, theologists or common people discussing issues of faith. Moreover, there are still 
other situations that prompt the use of existential statements, in which the interest is fo-
cused on a particular way of existing that is taken to be relevant to a certain purpose. Take 
into account examples such as the following dialogue:
Maria: Do you think that Peter could be promoted to president of the company?
Giulia: (17) No, he does not exist, the only possible candidate is Donald,
26 As before, I follow Kripke (2013) in presupposing that existence is a property of individuals and can be 
thus represented as a first-order predicate rather than a quantifier, but the point does not really depend 
on this assumption.
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where (17) is uttered with the intention to say not that Peter is dead but that he is abso-
lutely out of consideration when a certain purpose is at stake, which might be either ex-
plicit or implicit in the conversational context.27
On the basis of these considerations, I would like to maintain that an existential claim 
can be taken to be true or false from a certain perspective, which is determined by the kind 
of situation in which the utterance takes place. According to this, the content of existential 
statements will be true or false not only with respect to a world and a time parameter but 
also with respect to the perspective at stake: the one of common sense, a certain metaphysi-
cal perspective, the point of view determined by what is taken to be relevant in a certain 
situation, etc. If perspectives are taken on board, it can be said, for instance, that the above-
mentioned tokening of (17) is false with respect to the usual commonsense perspective 
but true with respect to the point of view adopted by someone who has a certain standard 
of relevance (concerning what it takes to reach a certain position in a company) in mind. 
Likewise, a tokening of (13) will come out true from a certain metaphysical perspective in 
the philosophy of mathematics (such as, for instance, Platonism) but false again from the 
standpoint of ‘the man in the street’.28
It is worth pointing out that the perspective varies with the kind of use that the exist-
ence predicate is being been made of. In other words, it is the different kinds of situations 
in which the existence predicate can be applied (ranging from everyday life to metaphysical 
debates) that allows for the different perspectives from which an existential statement can 
be evaluated as true or false. Grasping the perspective at stake depends on our pragmatic 
competence with the existence predicate, namely, our knowledge of the different situa-
tions in which it can be applied. It is a kind of pragmatic knowledge characteristic of lan-
guage users qua language users, not the kind of theoretical knowledge that could (or could 
not) settle a metaphysical dispute between Platonists and Nominalists. Independently of 
whether metaphysical disputes can be settled or not (namely, independently, for example, 
of whether it can be established that numbers exist, properties exist, etc.), it seems to be a 
fact that uses of existential statements in metaphysical debates are different from everyday 
27 Notice that sometimes the peculiar ways in which existence is ascribed to some entities are made ex-
plicit, as shown by the following examples:
 (13’) Numbers exist as Platonic Ideas
 (14’) Fairness exists as an ideal of justice
 (15’) Properties exist as instantiated universals
 (16’) God exists as the first cause of the universe/a loving father of his creatures
 (17’) Peter does not exist as a possible candidate for the presidency
 (18) Ulysses exists as the main character of the Odyssey.
28 Of course, a tokening of (13) will also come out false from the perspective of a Nominalist regarding 
numbers. I do not want to enter into the debate in the philosophy of mathematics on whether truth 
can only be relative to a certain theoretical perspective (Platonism, Nominalism, etc.). I am concerned 
with the more general (and, in principle, less controversial) claim that existential statements are to be 
evaluated with respect to a certain perspective in a more general sense of the term, according to which 
we can distinguish perspectives not on the basis of understanding rather complicated theoretical con-
ceptions but on the basis of grasping some basic features of the context of utterance (as will be empha-
sised below, this involves a pragmatic competence).
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uses: as above-mentioned, this is the ground for the introduction of the different perspec-
tives that seem to be relevant to the evaluation of existential statements.
So, coming back to our initial example of the factual use of the negative existential 
statement repeated below
(2) Ulysses does not exist,
it can be taken to be true from a commonsense perspective but false from a theoretical perspec-
tive, like the one represented by the abstractist about fictional discourse.
Finally, I have a clarification to make: throughout this discussion, I have been taking 
the factual interpretation of (2) (as much as of the other above-mentioned existential state-
ments) for granted, which may suggest that a certain perspective is relevant to evaluate ex-
istential statements once the factual interpretation has been assumed. However, it should be 
noticed that perspectives are at work also in fictional uses, since all the above-mentioned 
existential statements may occur within the framework of a fictional narrative or as a re-
port of what is told in a fictional story. So, the pragmatic knowledge of the situation in 
which the utterance or inscription of an existential statement takes place seems to play two 
importantly different roles: on the one hand, it serves to disambiguate it in the sense of dis-
tinguishing whether a fictional or a factual use is involved; on the other hand, it serves to 
identify the perspective that is constitutive of the corresponding circumstances of evalua-
tion, together with either a real or a purely fictional possible world and time.
4. Concluding remarks
This essay has focused on two different semantic problems that any abstractist theory of 
fictional discourse has to face. The first one is accounting for the truth of fictional uses, 
such as a token of our initial (1) as it occurs in the Odyssey, given that an abstract entity 
like Ulysses seems not to literally and strictly have the property of being asleep. In regard to 
this, I have suggested that fictional utterances and inscriptions involve a use of our imagina-
tive capacities that determines a context shift: the fictional story provides us with the world 
of evaluation, a viewpoint from which the characters, prey of our imagination, can be said 
to bear some human properties. The second one is accounting for some problematic fac-
tual uses, in particular, the utterances and inscriptions of intuitively true negative existen-
tials, such as (2) above, which on the abstractist framework come out false, since ‘Ulysses’ 
is taken to refer to an existent literary character. As far as this difficult issue is concerned, 
I have suggested that existential claims are to be evaluated with respect to not only a world 
and a time but also a certain perspective: different uses of (2) may then have different truth-
values, according to the perspective in play.
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